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INTRODUCTION
The Electoral College has resulted in the loser of the national popular
vote winning the presidency ﬁve times in our history, including twice in
the past two decades. Over the course of more than two centuries, it has
become one of the two most popular subjects for constitutional
amendment proposals.1 But because of the difficulty involved in
amending the U.S. Constitution,2 many of those opposed to the way we
choose the President have become resigned to the status quo. However,
others have been persuaded to pursue reform without resorting to the
amendment process set forth in Article V.3 Speciﬁcally, reformers have
* Bernard and Anne Spitzer Fellow, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of
Law; Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School (effective July 1, 2020). The author
would like to thank Alex Cohen, his colleague at the Brennan Center, and Magdalene Zier,
a summer legal intern, for their tremendous research support and other assistance for this
project. In addition, he would like to thank John F. Kowal, his colleague and coauthor of
the forthcoming book, The People’s Constitution, for his encouragement on this project and
others. He would also like to thank the various editors at the Columbia Law Review for
publishing this Piece and for their helpful suggestions throughout the editorial process. He
likewise extends his gratitude to the Harvard Law & Policy Review for organizing a timely
conference on the Electoral College as this Piece was undergoing edits, as well as the
numerous scholars and advocates who attended for their tremendous insights into some of
the topics discussed in this Piece. Last but certainly not least, the author dedicates this Piece
to the Honorable Deborah A. Batts, U.S.D.J., his trailblazing judge and loving mentor, who
recently passed away unexpectedly. Thank you DAB.
1. John R. Vile, 1 Encyclopedia of Constitutional Amendments, Proposed
Amendments, and Amending Issues, 1789–2002, at 159 (2d ed. 2003) (“No amendment
effort has been more consistent than that for reform of the electoral college. More than 850
proposals have been offered in Congress, making this topic second in overall numbers only
to the equal rights amendment.”).
2. See, e.g., Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in
Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment 237,
238–74 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (using a “systematic, comparative, and, to the extent
possible, empirical” method that reveals the U.S. Constitution is among the world’s most
difficult to amend).
3. U.S. Const. art. V. Article V, in relevant part, reads:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the
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rallied around the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, a plan that
seeks to elect the presidential candidate receiving the most votes
nationwide by leveraging states’ power over the Electoral College.
This Piece describes the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact
(NPVC) movement, particularly in light of recent political victories in the
western states that have brought success within advocates’ reach. It then
puts the campaign in a historical context, comparing it to an earlier effort
to secure democracy reform, also popularized in the American West: the
direct election of U.S. senators. This Piece then discusses three potential
challenges facing the NPVC: two recent decisions issued by courts in
western states, which may impact the operation of the Electoral College; a
mounting political campaign to have one western state withdraw its
support for the plan; and an attack from conservative legal commentators
arguing that the plan is unconstitutional. This Piece concludes with a brief
note of cautious optimism for advocates of the plan, namely that they can
prevail if they build on the campaign’s present momentum while heeding
the aforementioned obstacles, which I believe to be surmountable.
I. THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE INTERSTATE COMPACT,
TWELVE YEARS STRONG
In 2019, a few western states were in the news for taking on the
Electoral College. When the Oregon State Legislature passed S.B. 870,4
and Governor Kate Brown signed it into law,5 the Beaver State became the
third state west of the Mississippi—and the fourth state overall—to join the
NPVC last year. The action by lawmakers in Oregon, in addition to
Colorado, New Mexico, and Delaware, means that ﬁfteen states and the
District of Columbia are now signatories to the NPVC.6
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call
a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be
valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratiﬁed
by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by
Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of
Ratiﬁcation may be proposed by the Congress . . . .
Id.
4. Relating to the Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National
Popular Vote, S.B. 870, 80th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019).
5. Oregon Latest State to Join National Popular Vote Agreement, KGW (June 12, 2019),
https://www.kgw.com/article/news/politics/oregon-latest-state-to-join-national-popular-voteagreement/283-e1fb120d-7aa3-4e49-8ca6-0fdbc34d944b [https://perma.cc/Y389-LCKS] (last
updated June 13, 2019).
6. Colorado, Nat’l Popular Vote, https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/state/co
[https://perma.cc/2VZ6-3YC8] (last visited Nov. 1, 2019) (signed March 15, 2019); Delaware,
Nat’l Popular Vote, https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/state/de [https://perma.cc/3PZFHM39] (last visited Nov. 1, 2019) (signed March 28, 2019); New Mexico, Nat’l Popular Vote,
https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/state/nm [https://perma.cc/S4QC-QELM] (last visited
Nov. 1, 2019) (signed April 3, 2019). Twelve other jurisdictions (California, Connecticut, District
of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island,
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The NPVC is an innovative, state-based plan that seeks to ensure that
future presidents are elected with a majority in both the national popular
vote and the Electoral College. Party states agree to allocate their electoral
votes to the presidential candidate winning the greatest number of votes
cast nationwide. When states entitled to 270 total electoral votes pass
similar legislation—enough to determine the presidency—the NPVC will
take effect. The ﬂurry of activity over the last year means that the plan
needs sign-on from states accounting for just 74 more electoral votes.7
The genius of the NPVC is that it works within our current
constitutional design. While the Constitution never mentions the term
“Electoral College,” its basic structure is set forth in Article II. In Section
1 of that Article, the Constitution instructs “each state” to select its
allotment of presidential electors “in such manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct.”8 The text is unambiguous. It empowers state
lawmakers to decide how their state’s share of electors are chosen. The
Supreme Court affirmed this reading as early as 1892. In McPherson v.
Blacker, the Court minced no words in holding that “the appointment and
mode of appointment of electors belong exclusively to the States under
the Constitution of the United States.”9 The Court reiterated this wellsettled point more than a century later in its otherwise controversial Bush
v. Gore decision.10 When Florida’s electoral votes—and the presidency—
remained in limbo, ﬁve Justices ruled that “the state legislature’s power to
select the manner for appointing electors is plenary; it may, if it so chooses,
select the electors itself.”11
Most state legislatures have used this authority to pass legislation that
awards their electors to the presidential candidate winning the popular
vote in their state.12 Maine and Nebraska have used it to buck the trend of
the other 48 states and Washington, D.C.; the outlier pair split their
electoral votes, awarding two to the candidate winning the greatest
number of votes in the state overall, and the rest to the winner of each

Vermont, and Washington) signed onto the NPVC before last year. See Status of National
Popular Vote Bill in Each State, Nat’l Popular Vote, https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/statestatus [https://perma.cc/4Y2B-4L8Q] (last visited Nov. 1, 2019).
7. KGW, supra note 5.
8. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1.
9. 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892).
10. 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000); see also Spencer Overton, Stealing Democracy: The New
Politics of Voter Suppression 28–33 (2006) (describing the inappropriate role of Florida’s
then–Secretary of State Katherine Harris as an example of a referee playing favorites).
11. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104. One expert explained the extent of this plenary power,
comically noting that “any state[] could pass a law to appoint its electors using a basketball
tournament, scratch-off lottery cards, or at the sole discretion of the Governor.” Victoria
Bassetti, Electoral Disfunction: A Survival Manual for American Voters 77 (2012).
12. See Alex Cohen, The National Popular Vote, Explained, Brennan Ctr. for Justice
(Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/national-popular-vote-explained
[https://perma.cc/54BW-JDS9].
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congressional district.13 This is why, in 2016, Donald Trump was awarded
one of Maine’s four electoral votes, and in 2008, Barack Obama was
awarded one of Nebraska’s ﬁve.14 Likewise, the states that have enacted the
NPVC legislation have done so in accordance with this “plenary power.”
That is, these states have decided that, once enough states follow their
lead, they will use this constitutional authority to award their electors to
the winner of the most votes nationwide—even if it is not the candidate
winning the most votes within their states’ boundaries.
II.

REFORMING THE SENATE: FROM “TREASON” TO TRIUMPH

Western states like Oregon and Colorado may not be the NPVC’s
trailblazers—Maryland earned that honor back in 2007.15 But they do have
a distinctive history of leading the charge on this type of reform to expand
democracy. The “Oregon Plan” was part of an earlier effort to reform
another calciﬁed branch of the federal government: the Senate.16 Under
the original Constitution, state legislatures not only had discretion to
choose presidential electors however they deemed ﬁt, they also selected
U.S. Senators.17 Yet over time, this part of the Framers’ grand design
proved deeply ﬂawed. Senate seats remained vacant—for years, in some

13. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, § 805(2) (2020) (ﬁrst implemented in the 1972
presidential election); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-714 (2020) (ﬁrst implemented in the 1996
presidential election).
14. Mitch Smith, Blue Dot for Obama Prompts Red Nebraska to Revisit Electoral College
Rules, N.Y. Times (Jan. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/01/us/politics/blue-dotfor-obama-prompts-red-nebraska-to-revisit-electoral-college-rules.html [https://perma.cc/
BQ3W-CU4W]; Drew Desilver, Trump’s Victory Another Example of How Electoral College
Wins Are Bigger than Popular Vote Ones, Pew Research Ctr. (Dec. 20, 2016),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/12/20/why-electoral-college-landslides-areeasier-to-win-than-popular-vote-ones/ [https://perma.cc/Z7EU-5DMZ] (noting that Donald
Trump was awarded an electoral vote in Maine).
15. Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 8-5A-01 (West 2019) (“The State of Maryland hereby
enters the agreement among the states to elect the President by national popular
vote . . . .”); Bill Schneider, Dropping Out of the Electoral College, CNN (Apr. 10, 2007),
https://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/04/10/schneider.electoral/index.html [https://
perma.cc/538G-2Y3A].
16. Landmark Legislation: The Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution, U.S. Senate,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/SeventeenthAmendmen.htm
[https://perma.cc/529E-ZTBT] (last visited Oct. 31, 2019) (noting that Oregon implemented
measures in the early twentieth century “allowing voters to express their choice for senator” and
that other states followed this plan).
17. U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. Const. amend. XVII (“The Senate of
the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each state, chosen by the
legislature thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote.”); see also William
Howard Taft, Can Ratiﬁcation of an Amendment to the Constitution Be Made to Defend
on a Referendum, 29 Yale L.J. 821, 823 (1920) (“[T]he election of President and Senators
[by the legislature] . . . was, in the judgment of those who made and ratiﬁed the
Constitution, a sufficient submission to the will of the people under the principles of
popular representative government.”).
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instances18—as state legislatures deadlocked and were unable to ﬁll them.
This vacancy problem persisted despite the enactment of federal legislation
to address it,19 and it even plagued states whose legislatures were under
single-party control.20 In the face of impasse, the selection of senators
began to occupy an increasingly large portion of states’ legislative agenda.
As a result, Americans faced a double crisis: Their elected officials in the
state capitals—where the bulk of policy was made21—sacriﬁced legislative
resources to address the problem, and still they lacked adequate
representation in the nation’s capital.22
Actually, the Senate had presented a third crisis: During the period
following the Civil War, the chamber became a morass of corruption.23
With the “widening scope of federal power over commerce, tariff policy,
and the battle over the monetary standard,”24 the foot soldiers of corporate
interests descended upon senators, and the state legislators that appointed
them, to exert their inﬂuence. Not only did plutocrats buy state lawmakers
to get their industry’s guy into the Senate,25 but members of that chamber
18. Delaware’s United States Senators, U.S. Senate, http://www.senate.gov/states/DE/
senators.htm [https://perma.cc/H7E6-M7M3] (last visited Oct. 31, 2019) (noting five instances
of vacancies because of the failure of the legislature to elect, three of which lasted for more than
a year).
19. Act of July 25, 1866, ch. 245, 14 Stat. 243 (providing a deadline to state legislatures
for ﬁlling Senate vacancies); Russell L. Caplan, Constitutional Brinksmanship: Amending
the Constitution by National Convention 62 (1988) (“Between 1891 and 1905, forty-ﬁve
deadlocks occurred nationwide.”).
20. Wendy J. Schiller, Charles Stewart III & Benjamin Xiong, U.S. Senate Elections
Before the 17th Amendment: Political Party Cohesion and Conﬂict 1871–1913, 75 J. Pol.
835, 839–40 (2013) (“Another Senate election from that same year in Kentucky provides
the counterexample of a majority caucus unable to resolve internal divisions, ultimately
leaving the Senate seat vacant.”).
21. Stephen M. Griffith, American Constitutionalism: From Politics to Theory 34
(1996) (“The states had primary responsibility for tasks of government—they pursued
mercantilist policies to stimulate economic development, set money and banking policies,
subsidized transportation, and dealt with crime, poverty, and various religious and moral
issues.”).
22. Zachary D. Clopton & Steven E. Art, The Meaning of the Seventeenth Amendment
and a Century of State Deﬁance, 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1181, 1189 (2013) (“Reformers stressed
that the legislative selection of senators consumed state legislative agendas with national
issues at the expense of local concerns . . . .”).
23. Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A Structural Examination
of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 1347, 1353 (1996) [hereinafter Amar,
Indirect Effects] (“State legislative corruption and special interest group control were
perhaps the greatest evils associated with indirect election.”); Daniel T. Shedd, Note, Money
for Senate Seats and Other Seventeenth Amendment Politicking: How to Amend the
Constitution to Prevent Political Scandal During the Filling of Senate Vacancies, 79 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 960, 966 (2011) (noting six investigations from 1866 to 1906 into senate
bribery scandals, including one involving $1 million).
24. Schiller et al., supra note 20, at 837.
25. Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography 412–13 (2005) [hereinafter
Amar, America’s Constitution] (noting that “large corporations, monopolies, trusts, and
other special-interest groups” corruptly inﬂuenced the Senate election process); Alan P.
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also understood the market value of their new office. While wealthier
incoming senators used their role to preserve and grow their riches, those
of more limited means leveraged their appointment as an opportunity to
fraternize among the business elite and well connected to establish their
own fortunes.26 As the growing “factionalization” within state parties
combined with the “outside pressure of inﬂuential campaign contributors
and bribery itself, any expectations that constituents had about who their
state legislators would eventually elect to the U.S. Senate [were] generally
tenuous, at best.”27 There was a growing chasm between Americans and
the senators who were supposed to be representing them (even if
indirectly) in Washington.28
In justifying their creation of the Senate, the Framers argued that it
would consist of a “temperate and respectable body of citizens” who would
protect it during times when they are “stimulated by some irregular
passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful
misrepresentations of interested men.”29 In the lead up to the twentieth
century, however, it was clear that their prediction—“that the federal
Senate will never be able to transform itself, by gradual usurpations, into
an independent and aristocratic body”30—could not have been further off
the mark.31
Nevertheless, the Framers had put in place a backstop for an errant
Senate: bicameralism. They argued that “the House of Representatives,
with the people on their side, will at all times be able to bring back the
Constitution to its primitive form and principles.”32 For decades, the
House of Representatives tried to intercede, pushing for a constitutional
Grimes, Democracy and the Amendments to the Constitution 75–76 (1978) (describing the
process by which “political bosses” inﬂuenced Senate elections).
26. Schiller et al., supra note 20, at 837.
27. Id. at 838.
28. Clopton & Art, supra note 22, at 1190 (noting that states’ popular representation
is thwarted when “inﬁghting among larger parties” results in a senator being selected from
a minority party, or when gerrymandering of state legislative districts “prevent[s] equal
representation in the state legislature,” thus producing a senator who failed to “represent
the entire state”).
29. The Federalist No. 63, at 320 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
30. Id. at 324.
31. David Schleicher, The Seventeenth Amendment and Federalism in an Age of
National Political Parties, 65 Hastings L.J. 1043, 1080 (2014) (describing how proponents
of direct elections, including legal historian Herman Ames, thought they were more
democratic, less likely to lead to corrupt or undeserving candidates, would end deadlocks,
and would lessen the effect of national affairs on state and local politics (citing Herman V.
Ames, The Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United States During the First
Century of its History 62–63 (1897))); Schiller et al., supra note 20, at 846 (concluding that
“[t]he Framers would have been disappointed by . . . indirect U.S. Senate elections,” which
“combined with inexperienced and short-term state legislators,” encouraged corruption,
thwarted representative choices for the Senate, and left Senate seats vacant “far more
frequently than under direct elections”).
32. Madison, supra note 29, at 324.
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amendment for the direct election of senators. In fact, on at least half a
dozen occasions between 1893 and 1912, a resolution to amend the
Constitution passed the House.33 At one point, William Randolph Hearst,
the media titan famed for his newspapers’ radically disruptive and
sensationalist approach to reporting (who was also a congressman at the
time), tried his outsized hand at making the Senate’s grift public.34 In
1906, the Hearst Corporation funded the muckraking David Graham
Phillips to pen The Treason of the Senate, a series of exposés that graphically
depicted the body as “a club of corrupt millionaires.”35 All of this was to
no avail. The Senate stood in the way, unsurprisingly. Its refusal to vote on
the House measures demonstrated the weakness in yet another of the
Framers’ contingencies.
The status quo was wholly unacceptable. The situation was dire, but
reformers in the states were unwilling to remain idle spectators to the
dissolution of the democratic form of government promised to them more
than a century earlier. And in their darkest hour came clarity, inspiration,
and creativity that directed them to the Framers’ fail-safe: “the people
themselves.”36
Around the turn of the century, as states were increasingly adopting
populist and Progressive Era policies, many began to experiment with a
novel federal election reform.37 The states had been called upon to
conduct various forms of advisory elections to determine the people’s
33. 24 Cong. Rec. 618 (1893); 26 Cong. Rec. 7782 (1894); 31 Cong. Rec. 4825 (1898);
33 Cong. Rec. 4128 (1900); 35 Cong. Rec. 1722 (1902); 48 Cong. Rec. 6367 (1912).
34. See Matthew Schneirov, Popular Magazines, New Liberal Discourse and American
Democracy, 1890s–1914, 16 J. Gilded Age & Progressive Era 121, 133 (2017) (noting that
Hearst’s radical journalists’ “central muckraking themes of mobilizing public opinion to
combat corporate corruption of public life and more broadly the corruption of social
institutions . . . resonated with a middle-class public”); id. at 135 (“Hearst was the most
prominent publisher in bringing a core of radical journalists to national attention, including
prominent members of the Socialist Party.”).
35. Schleicher, supra note 31, at 1056; see also Clopton & Art, supra note 22, at 1191
(referring to The Treason of the Senate as one of the famous examples of the press attempting
“to provoke (and perhaps reﬂect) the public desire to elect senators”); Schneirov, supra
note 34, at 135 (“Various authors exposed the horrors of child labor (Edward Markham’s
Hoe-Man in the Making), nefarious plutocrats (Alfred Henry Lewis’s on Andrew Carnegie)
and the corruption of the U.S. Senate by business interests (David Graham Phillip’s Treason
of the Senate).”).
36. Madison, supra note 29, at 325; cf. Larry Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular
Constitutionalism and Judicial Review 108 (2004) (“From the perspective of the 1790s,
however, an idea of ‘the people’ as a collective body capable of acting independently from
within the political system was more serviceable . . . . [P]olitics was the proper forum, the
people were the proper agent, and ‘political-legal’ devices were the proper means.”); id. at
109 (describing the “social and political developments in the 1790s” that “vastly enlarged
the role and importance of an emerging democratic public sphere” and led various forms
of popular engagement in constitutional politics).
37. Schleicher, supra note 31, at 1055 (“Scholars usually date the beginning of the
national movement in favor of direct elections to the 1870s, when advocates introduced the
ﬁrst real efforts to amend the Constitution in Congress.”).
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preference for the U.S. Senate. As candidates campaigned for seats in the
state legislature, voters pressed them to honor the advisory poll. Soon,
candidates were pledging to support whomever won the informal
balloting.38 And while many states embraced this approach, Oregon went
further: Its eponymous plan, adopted through an amendment to its own
constitution, bound state legislators to pick the Senate candidates winning
the greatest voter support.39 It was a state-based solution to democratize
and “purify” the Senate.40 Reformers had achieved a popular mode of
electing their senators that was permitted by the U.S. Constitution, but
“accord[ed] better with the democratic ideals on which the Constitution
was founded.”41 By the time the Senate ﬁnally approved the Seventeenth
Amendment in 1912 (which, when ratiﬁed a year later, enshrined the right
of the people to elect their senators directly), well over half of the country
had already been selecting their senators.42 In the end, the reform not only
eliminated the deadlock crisis and helped to lessen public corruption, it
had the added beneﬁt of creating greater parity among individual citizens’
voting power and inducing candidates to expand their mobilization and
outreach efforts.43
What today’s NPVC advocates are now trying to do for presidential
elections is what their kindred spirits, the supporters of the Oregon Plan,
accomplished some 100 years ago: reform the method of selecting their
political leaders by working within the current system until enough
pressure exists to change that system. Much like the original Senate, the
Electoral College fails to operate in line with the Framers’ vision. It no
longer consists of “men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted
to the station,”44 and it neither fosters “circumstances favorable to
deliberation,”45 nor “to a judicious combination of all the reasons and
38. Amar, America’s Constitution, supra note 25, at 411; Grimes, supra note 25, at 76.
39. Amar, America’s Constitution, supra note 25, at 411; Amar, Indirect Effects, supra
note 23, at 1354 (referring to the Oregon Plan as “[t]he most sophisticated and effective
device” for “limiting state legislators’ discretion in their choice of Senators”).
40. Amar, Indirect Effects, supra note 23, at 1353.
41. Id. at 1354.
42. Grimes, supra note 25, at 76; Schleicher, supra note 31, at 1056 (“By 1908, twentyeight of the forty-ﬁve states used the Oregon system or some other form of direct elections,
some adopted through the initiative process and others through legislative action.”); see
also 45 Cong. Rec. 7109–20 (1910).
43. Amar, America’s Constitution, supra note 25, at 413 (noting that “a modest
reduction in state governmental corruption” and “the impact of state malapportionment
and gerrymandering” were among “the bigger effects of the” Seventeenth Amendment).
44. The Federalist No. 68, at 344 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009)
[hereinafter Hamilton, Federalist No. 68]. But cf. Bassetti, supra note 11, at 75–76, 80
(2012) (describing how the nineteen-year-old son of a party insider became a state’s
presidential elector in 2008).
45. Hamilton, Federalist No. 68, supra note 44, at 344. But cf. Keith E. Whittington,
Originalism, Constitutional Construction, and the Problem of Faithless Electors, 59 Ariz. L.
Rev. 903, 913–18 (2017) (describing the lobbying and harassment of electors in the
aftermath of the 2016 presidential election in an attempt to have them change their vote);
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inducements which were proper to govern their choice.”46 Nor is the
Electoral College still needed to overcome the difficulty of obtaining the
information requisite to making informed political judgments.47 In these
respects, circumstances have obviated the need for an intermediary
between the people and the presidential candidates. Maintaining the
anachronistic institution for selecting the President seems more of a
salute to the hyperelitist notion that the people cannot be trusted to
decide the question for themselves48 (a notion that was bandied about at
the Constitutional Convention).49 Also like the original Senate, the
Electoral College distorts political and public policy decisionmaking,
while diminishing the level of public accountability. It encourages
presidential candidates to concentrate election spending50 and campaign
appearances51 in a handful of battleground states, while permitting them
to ignore virtually the other seventy-ﬁve percent of the country.52 Once
chosen, presidents have warped reelection incentives—fostered by the
Electoral College’s campaign structure—to govern in the interest of the
residents in those same few states at the expense of the rest of the
country.53
id. at 917 (“The public effort to mobilize a lobbying campaign to inﬂuence the electoral
vote has led to an unprecedented level of harassment of the individuals who serve in that
role.”).
46. Hamilton, Federalist No. 68, supra note 44, at 344. But cf. Whittington, supra note
45, at 936 (“But with the rise of political parties and electioneering, the electors became
superﬂuous and by common societal agreement lost the right to exercise discretion in
choosing a president . . . . They were to be clerks, not kingmakers.”).
47. See, e.g. 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 29 (Max Farrand ed.,
1991) (statement of Roger Sherman) (claiming that “the people at large . . . will never be
sufficiently informed of characters” of the candidates for election).
48. Indeed, even getting to this point was a mark of progress. It reﬂected a change in
the operation of the Electoral College over the nineteenth century, when state legislators
relinquished their right to choose electors, instead allowing state residents to vote for who
would be appointed as electors. See Grimes, supra note 25, at 76.
49. See, e.g., 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, supra note 47, at 30
(statement of George Mason) (“[I]t would be as unnatural to refer the choice of a proper
character for chief Magistrate to the people, as it would, to refer a trial of colours to a blind
man.”); id. at 114 (statement of Elbridge Gerry) (“A popular election in this case is radically
vicious. The ignorance of the people would put it in the power of some one set of men
dispersed through the Union & acting in Concert to delude them into any appointment.”).
50. Lawrence Lessig, Electoral College Confusions, Hill (Oct. 31, 2018), https://
thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/413998-electoral-college-confusions [https://
perma.cc/Q497-ZB4L].
51. Two-Thirds of Presidential Campaign Is in Just 6 States, Nat’l Popular Vote,
https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/campaign-events-2016 [https://perma.cc/QLC4SCVM] (last visited Nov. 2, 2019).
52. Paul Schumaker & Burdett A. Loomis, Choosing a President: The Electoral College
and Beyond 102–03 (2002) (“Presidential campaigns have a clear tendency to concentrate
their resources on a relatively small number of competitive states . . . while ignoring states
that appear solidly to favor one camp or the other.”).
53. Brian M. Faughnan & John Hudak, Presidential Pandering: How Elections
Determine the Exercise of Executive Power in the U.S. and Colombia, Issues in Governance
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Most importantly, however, the Electoral College, like the original
Senate, has become an anathema to our professed American values. It
allows some votes to count more than others, which is hostile to the
fundamental principle that in a fair and just society, every person’s vote
should be worth the same.54 When Nevada’s governor vetoed his state’s
NPVC bill earlier this year, he tweeted his reasoning: “Once effective, the
National Popular Vote Interstate Compact could diminish the role of
smaller states like Nevada in national electoral contests and force Nevada’s
electors to side with whoever wins the nationwide popular vote, rather than
the candidate Nevadans choose.”55 The Governor’s tweet makes a subtle,
unwritten point: Under the current system, Americans residing in his state
have a greater say in choosing the President because their votes are given
more weight than are the votes of other Americans. Recently, there has
been no shortage of commentary about this phenomenon and whether it
renders the United States a democracy or a republic.56 In fact, this only
causes needless confusion. Just as in a democracy,57 “the fundamental
maxim of republican government . . . requires that the sense of the
Stud., Nov. 2012, at 1, 4 (“Incumbent presidents use campaign resources to help achieve
electoral success, but they can also use the powers of their office to do the same. As a result,
policy outcomes often aim to beneﬁt key constituencies in critical states.”).
54. See, e.g., Wilfred Codrington III, The Electoral College’s Racist Origins, Atlantic
(Nov. 16, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/11/electoral-collegeracist-origins/601918/ [https://perma.cc/9JR9-DGGK] (“[M]ore than two centuries after
it was designed to empower southern whites, the Electoral College continues to do just that.
The current system has a distinct, adverse impact on black voters, diluting their political
power.”).
55. Steve Sisolak (@GovSisolak), Twitter (May 30, 2019), https://twitter.com/GovSisolak/
status/1134148586734702593 [https://perma.cc/7VEF-H6NP].
56. See, e.g., Dan Crenshaw (@DanCrenshawTX), Twitter (Aug. 24, 2019), https://
twitter.com/dancrenshawtx/status/1165403952411750401?s=21 [https://perma.cc/583ZRK4Q] (“Abolishing the electoral college means that politicians will only campaign in (and listen
to) urban areas. That is not a representative democracy. We live in a republic, which means 51%
of the population doesn’t get to boss around the other 49%.”); see also Jamelle Bouie, Alexandria
Ocasio-Cortez Understands Democracy Better than Republicans Do, N.Y. Times (Aug. 27, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/27/opinion/aoc-crenshaw-republicans-democracy.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review). In response to President Trump’s call to retain the
Electoral College, Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez publicized a 2012 tweet from
Donald Trump that criticized the Electoral College. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (@AOC),
Twitter (Aug. 27, 2019), https://twitter.com/AOC/status/1166495294776893440 [https://
perma.cc/2JQS-HJST] (“I’m so glad the President and I agree that the Electoral College has got
to go.”); see also Jack Holmes, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Brought the Receipts on Donald
Trump and the Electoral College, Esquire (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.esquire.com/
news-politics/a28842736/alexandria-ocasio-cortez-electoral-college-donald-trump-campaign/
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
57. Bassetti, supra note 11, at 77 (“After all, in a democracy, the majority rules. But the
Electoral College works differently.”); see also Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The
Contested History of Democracy in the United States 285 (2000) (explaining the Supreme
Court’s justiﬁcation for invalidating malapportioned legislative districts because they
“violated not only the equal protection clause, but the very notion of equality undergirding
American democracy”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3619144

2020]

SO GOES THE NATION

53

majority should prevail.”58 Weighing some votes more heavily than others
is a deﬁning characteristic of neither a democracy nor a republic, but a
system of minority rule. And it is contrary to twenty-ﬁrst century American
values.59 The NPVC seeks to meet the Electoral College on its terms and
mitigate some of its gravest ills.
III. THREE (FINAL?) CHALLENGES
A.

Article II and the Twelfth Amendment: Keeping the Faith?

Recently, two courts out West decided cases that raise important
questions about how the Electoral College functions—or malfunctions.
Neither case involves the NPVC directly but, rather, states’ control over
electors. The more recent decision, Baca v. Colorado Department of State,
comes out of the Tenth Circuit.60 In that case, Michael Baca, one of
Colorado’s electors, ignored his vow to vote for Hillary Clinton and was
subsequently replaced as an elector. The court concluded the state’s
action to replace Mr. Baca was unconstitutional because, “while the
Constitution grants the states plenary power to appoint their electors, it
does not provide the states the power to interfere once voting
begins . . . .”61 Article II and the Twelfth Amendment neither permit the
state to remove an elector, nor to direct other electors to disregard the
defecting elector’s vote, nor to appoint a new elector in his stead.62
Three months earlier, the Washington State Supreme Court issued its
opinion in another case, In re Guerra.63 That court held that it was lawful
for the state to impose a ﬁnancial penalty on Mr. Guerra and his fellow
electors who violated their pledges. The court observed that, implicit in
the state’s “absolute authority” to appoint electors is the power “to impose
a ﬁne on electors for failing to uphold their pledge, and that ﬁne does not
interfere with any federal function” of the elector under the
Constitution.64 Article II and the Twelfth Amendment afford the state
discretion to set conditions for the appointment of electors, which, in turn,
permits them to impose penalties on electors who defy those conditions—
including the requirement that they vote in a predetermined manner.

58. The Federalist No. 22, at 109 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
59. Indeed, it was against eighteenth-century American values. See id. (giving a
political advantage to less populous states goes against “[e]very idea of proportion and every
rule of fair representation”).
60. 935 F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 2019).
61. Id. at 943.
62. Id.
63. 441 P.3d 807 (Wash. 2019).
64. Id. at 814.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3619144

54

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 120:43

On January 17, 2020, the Court granted certiorari in these cases.65
Together they present three critical legal questions,66 but in essence, they
boil down to one larger question: How much independence does the
Constitution afford to electors once they are appointed? In answering this,
the Court has three options that stand out. It can rule that states may: (1)
sanction and remove faithless electors to enforce the will of voters; (2)
sanction but not remove faithless electors; or (3) neither sanction nor
remove electors, thus freeing them to exercise discretion. Notably, the
Court’s ultimate decision would impact the current system of choosing the
President and the NPVC equally. Both systems are based on the
assumption that electors will honor their pledges and vote according to
state law. Whether the state law requires them to vote for the candidate

65. Colo. Dep’t of State v. Baca, cert. granted No. 19-518, 2020 WL 254162 (U.S. Jan. 17,
2020); see also Order List: 589 U.S. (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/
courtorders/011720zr_h31j.pdf [https://perma.cc/XL96-SRBB] (granting certiorari). Despite
the Supreme Court’s decision to grant cert, the lower courts’ rulings could have been reconciled
substantively. The Colorado case asks whether a state’s power to appoint electors also implies the
power to remove them. In the Washington case, however, the state supreme court did not address
the state’s purported removal authority, only the narrower power to fine defiant electors. All of
this is evident from the ultimate conduct of those states’ electors in 2016. Mr. Baca, Colorado’s
“Hamiltonian” or “faithless” elector, was removed and replaced with someone else who voted for
Hillary Clinton in compliance with the pledge. Certificate of Filing Presidential Elector Vacancy,
State of Colo. Dep’t of State (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/
electoral-college/2016-certificates/pdfs/vote-washington.pdf [https://perma.cc/7L2X-SM9C].
Notwithstanding the lack of inherent tension, the Court’s decision to intercede was probably the
prudent one, given that thirty-two states and the District of Columbia mandate electors to take a
pledge, and eleven actually call for defiant electors to be removed. Faithless Elector State Laws,
FairVote, https://www.fairvote.org/faithless_elector_state_laws [https://perma.cc/84CL-76B7]
(last visited Nov. 3, 2019) (“There are 32 states (plus the District of Columbia) that require
electors to vote for a pledged candidate. Most of those states (17 plus DC) nonetheless do not
provide for any penalty or any mechanism to prevent the deviant vote.”). By granting cert, the
Court has the opportunity to address the question before a post–Election Day frenzy and can
prevent the presidency from being thrown in limbo for the second time in two decades.
66. These questions are framed as follows:
Whether a presidential elector who is prevented by their appointing state
from casting an electoral-college ballot that violates state law lacks standing to
sue their appointing state because they hold no constitutionally protected
right to exercise discretion; [w]hether Article II or the 12th Amendment
forbids a state from requiring its presidential electors to follow the state’s
popular vote when casting their electoral-college ballots; and [w]hether
enforcement of a Washington state law that threatens a fine for presidential
electors who vote contrary to how the law directs is unconstitutional because
a state has no power to legally enforce how a presidential elector casts his or
her ballot and a state penalizing an elector for exercising his or her
constitutional discretion to vote violates the First Amendment.
Colorado Department of State v. Baca, Scotus Blog, https://www.scotusblog.com/
case-files/cases/colorado-department-of-state-v-baca/ [https://perma.cc/GX9FCV6J] (last visited Mar. 15, 2020); Chiafalo v. Washington, Scotus Blog, https://
www.scotusblog.com/case-ﬁles/cases/chiafalo-v-washington/ [https://perma.cc/
8GKL-3WVH] (last visited Mar. 15, 2020).
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receiving the most votes within the state or the one receiving the greatest
number of votes nationally is irrelevant.
If the Court reaches the merits of either case,67 it’s not clear that the
decision—even one ﬁnding that electors have unfettered discretion to
exercise independent judgment—will have a signiﬁcant impact on the
outcome of presidential elections. Historically, the vast majority of
presidential electors have voted for their party’s nominee, and those that
have defected have typically been electors for the party that lost the
electoral vote.68 Even then, they switch their vote not to the other major
party candidate, but to a third-party or protest candidate. While past
conduct is not necessarily a predictor of future conduct, there is no reason
to believe the electors chosen from the winning party will want to “throw”
the contest either to the other candidate or to the House of
Representatives to decide in a contingent election.69 Likewise, in the event
of such a ruling, the state political parties (which largely choose electors
on behalf of the state legislatures) would almost certainly tighten their
elector selection rules to limit the likelihood of defection; they might go
so far as to adopt the Pennsylvania model, which permits the presidential
nominee to select the electors.70 Of course, if the Court rules that states
have constitutional authority to penalize and even remove electors, the
decision will only impact the rare would-be rogue elector.71 If anything,
the Colorado and Washington cases just expose the ﬂaws of the Electoral
67. The Court would have yet another option: It could punt on the question altogether. By
reversing the Tenth Circuit decision on the standing question, it would be able to enforce the
status quo without addressing the merits of the case. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, The Coming
Reckoning over the Electoral College, Slate (Sept. 4, 2019), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2019/09/electoral-college-supreme-court-lessig-faithless-electors.html [https://
perma.cc/7SYX-EHEE] (noting that one of the judges did not reach the merits of the Tenth
Circuit decision on jurisdictional grounds); 19-518 Colorado Department of State v. Baca, U.S.
Supreme Court, https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/qp/19-00518qp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JUY9-M8ZS] (last visited Jan. 20, 2020) (docket) (framing the question
presented as “[w]hether a presidential elector who is prevented by their appointing State from
casting an Electoral College ballot that violates state law lacks standing to sue their appointing
State because they hold no constitutionally protected right to exercise discretion”).
68. Lily Rothman, Hillary Clinton Isn’t Alone. Losing Candidates Often Have Faithless
Electors., Time (Dec. 20, 2016), https://time.com/4607933/clinton-trump-faithless-electorsprecedent/ [https://perma.cc/C52L-CTD9] (describing the tendency of “faithless electors” to
accompany losing candidates and serve as protest votes).
69. See Derek T. Muller, Why “Faithless Electors” Have Little Power to Change the
Winner of Presidential Elections, Excess of Democracy Blog (Oct. 14, 2019),
https://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2019/10/why-faithless-electors-have-little-power-tochange-the-winner-of-presidential-elections [https://perma.cc/X3LJ-43UK] (arguing that
electors’ historical voting patterns provide little reason to believe that they will swing the
election).
70. 25 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 2878 (2019) (“The nominee of each political party for the
office of President of the United States shall, within thirty days after his nomination by the
National convention of such party, nominate as many persons to be the candidates of his
party for the office of presidential elector as the State is then entitled to.”).
71. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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College; they demonstrate that uncertainty and the potential for chaos are
the consequences of maintaining a system that trusts 538 political insiders
to select the Commander in Chief instead of allowing some 140 million
American voters to choose for themselves.
B.

The NPVC Repeal Effort: A Brief (but Serious) Political Interlude

The Colorado and Washington cases aside, the NPVC is being
ﬂanked, facing assaults from at least two directions. Coincidentally, the
more immediate battle also involves Colorado. The state is now grappling
with a well-funded countereffort to have its NPVC legislation rescinded.72
Conservative political operatives have obtained a record-breaking number
of petition signatures to force a referendum on the measure’s repeal, and
the Secretary of State’s office has certiﬁed the question to appear on the
2020 ballot.73 A successful repeal campaign would be a devastating blow
for democracy reforms—landing a one-two combo that could have dire
consequences for political reform efforts in Colorado as well as the larger
NPVC movement. On the one hand, repeal could encourage a deluge of
corporate money to fund ballot measures in the state to supplant
thoughtful reform policies enacted by elected lawmakers.74 On the other,
the repeal of Colorado’s law would cost the NPVC nine of its committed
electoral votes and the loss of a purple state. And given this critical

72. Referendum Petition for Senate Bill #19-042 (National Popular Vote), Colo. Sec’y of
State, https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/referendumPetitions.html [https://
perma.cc/C9CZ-LXEJ] (last visited Nov. 3, 2019); see also Marianne Goodland, Drive to Repeal
National Popular Vote Compact Makes Colorado’s 2020 Ballot, Colo. Pol. (Aug. 29, 2019),
https://www.coloradopolitics.com/news/drive-to-repeal-national-popular-vote-compact-makescolorado-s/article_c533bed0-ca76-11e9-9459-e3bdeca6799c.html [https://perma.cc/KN7QKB7W].
73. Reid Wilson, National Popular Vote Initiative Will Appear on Colorado Ballot, Hill
(Aug. 29, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/459300-national-popular-voteinitiative-will-appear-on-colorado-ballot [https://perma.cc/DFL6-NS6S].
74. Corporate money from both in and out of state has already flooded into state ballot
campaigns, which in many states, do not have the contribution limits and regulation of
candidate campaigns. See Marianne Goodland, National Popular Vote Campaign in Colorado
Gets Strong Fundraising Support — from California, Colo. Pol. (Oct 31, 2019),
https://www.coloradopolitics.com/news/national-popular-vote-campaign-in-colorado-getsstrong-fundraising-support/article_9643c010-fc04-11e9-ba4c-07c175558a78.html [https://
perma.cc/RSB7-WAA9] (noting that the bulk of the funds raised by the pro-NPV campaign came
from consisted of contributions from outside of Colorado, and the biggest contributions to date
for the anti-NPV effort have come through dark money groups that do not disclose their donors);
Elaine S. Povich, Big Money Pours into State Ballot Issue Campaigns, Pew Charitable Trusts
Stateline (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/
stateline/2016/09/23/big-money-pours-into-state-ballot-issue-campaigns [https://perma.cc/
7NZU-2NAJ] (“State ballot campaigns this year are attracting millions of dollars from
corporations, unions, wealthy individuals and special interest groups, as referendums
increasingly replace legislatures as a battleground for people who want to make state policy, on
issues . . . . ”).
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juncture for the NPVC—again, just 74 electoral votes away from taking
effect—a change in the narrative would itself be a setback.75
C.

The Constitution Post-2020

The NPVC movement has also been facing stealth attacks from
another front. There are some within conservative legal circles who claim
that the NPVC is unconstitutional.76 Their arguments largely hinge on two
provisions of the Constitution—the Interstate Compact Clause77 and
Article V.78 The contention based on the former provision is that, absent
approval from Congress, the NPVC would violate the Constitution because
it would establish “cartels, collusion, and combinations” among party
states.79 As to the latter provision, the argument against the NPVC is that
it would run afoul of the Constitution for, in effect, changing it without
going through the formal amending process.80 Both contentions are weak.
While the Guerra and Baca cases are bound to resolve the elector discretion
issue and, therefore, the meaning of Article II and the Twelfth
Amendment, there are clear and well-established understandings of both
the Compact Clause and Article V, both of which should remain unaltered.
1. Article I: Keeping the Compact Clause Compact. — The Interstate
Compact Clause argument is a textual argument.81 It stems from Article I
75. See, e.g., Eli Watkins, Nevada Governor Rejects Effort to Join Popular Vote Compact,
CNN (May 30, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/30/politics/nevada-popular-vote-vetosisolak/ [https://perma.cc/AGW2-FKV7] (describing Governor Sisolak’s veto as “a blow to the
movement” to elect the president by popular vote, which has otherwise made great progress).
76. See, e.g., Kristin Feeley, Guaranteeing a Federally Elected President, 103 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1427, 1444–52 (2009) (arguing that the NPVC may violate the Guarantee Clause);
Derek T. Muller, The Compact Clause and the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact,
6 Election L.J. 372, 389–93 (2007) [hereinafter Muller, The Compact Clause] (arguing that
the NPVC violates the Compact Clause); Norman R. Williams, Why the National Popular
Vote Compact Is Unconstitutional, 2012 BYU L. Rev. 1523, 1540, 1581 (2012) (arguing that
the NPVC is unconstitutional because it violates Article II of the Constitution); David
Gringer, Note, Why the National Popular Vote Plan Is the Wrong Way to Abolish the
Electoral College, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 182, 226 (2008) (describing debate over
characterization of the NPVC as an interstate compact, and whether congressional approval
is required).
77. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
78. Id. art. V.
79. See, e.g., Muller, The Compact Clause, supra note 76, at 386 (quoting Michael S.
Greve, Compacts, Cartels, and Congressional Intent, 68 Mo. L. Rev. 285, 310 (2003)); see
also id. at 372 (“[B]ecause the Clause is concerned with a shift in political power among the
states, the diminished political effectiveness of the non-compacting states’ electoral votes is
a sufficient interest to invoke the procedural safeguard of congressional consent and render
the Interstate Compact unconstitutional in the absence of that consent.”).
80. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 76, at 1581 (calling it “inconceivable that a
Constitution that speciﬁes how the President is to be elected and that lays out a process for
amending its requirements would permit a group of states to alter so fundamental a part of
our constitutional structure”).
81. Gringer, supra note 76, at 226 (“By the terms of Article I, Section 10 of the
Constitution, congressional approval would then be required.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3619144

58

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 120:43

language providing, in part, that “no state shall, without the consent of
Congress, . . . enter into any agreement or compact with another
state . . . .”82 On its face, the clause reads as an outright prohibition on
compacts that lack sanction from federal lawmakers. Were that the rule,
federal lawmakers representing NPVC member states could introduce
legislation to that end and advocate for its passage.83 Indeed, the Court has
explained that Congress can give its imprimatur to compacts ex ante or ex
post,84 and, in fact, that compacts can be lawful even if they only have
Congress’s implied consent.85
But the argument that federal lawmakers would even have to give
their consent assumes that the NPVC is the type of compact that needs
congressional sanction. It is not. The claim that the NPVC falls into that
family of compacts is a superﬁcial one that relies on a wishful, but
incorrect, understanding of the legal doctrine relating to the otherwise
obscure constitutional provision.
In Virginia v. Tennessee, the prevailing authority on the Compact
Clause, the Supreme Court not only explained which types of agreements
fall within the Clause’s ambit, it also laid out the basic test for when such
an agreement would require congressional approval.86 As to the Compact
Clause, the Court wrote:
[T]he latter clause, “compacts and agreement,” might then
very properly apply to such as regarded what might be deemed
mere private rights of sovereignty, such as questions of

82. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
83. Notably, Akhil and Vikram Amar argue that the NPVC would “[p]robably not” be
understood as “an implicit interstate agreement requiring congressional blessing under Article
I, section 10 of the Constitution[.]” Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, How to Achieve
Direct National Election of the President Without Amending the Constitution, FindLaw (Dec.
28, 2001), https://supreme.ﬁndlaw.com/legal-commentary/how-to-achieve-direct-nationalelection-of-the-president-without-amending-the-constitution.html [https://perma.cc/Z57E7G9P]. For the sake of argument, I assume that it is such an agreement.
84. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 521 (1893) (holding that consent to a compact
“may be implied, and is always to be implied when Congress adopts the particular act by
sanctioning its objects and aiding in enforcing them”).
85. Id. at 527 (“The compact of the two States, establishing the line adopted by their
commissioners, and to which Congress impliedly assented after its execution, is binding
upon both States and their citizens.”).
86. Id.; see Jacob Finkel, Note, Stranger in the Land of Federalism: A Defense of the
Compact Clause, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 1575, 1583–85 (2019) (describing Virginia v. Tennessee as
the “blow” to a textualist reading of the Compact Clause “that reverberates today”). Notably,
in an earlier case, the Court suggested it might apply a stricter reading of the Compact
Clause. Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 494 (1854) (“And if Florida and Georgia
had, by negotiation and agreement, proceeded to adjust this boundary, any compact
between them would have been null and void, without the assent of congress.”). However,
this language was included in dicta, and the Court rejected the approach in Virginia v.
Tennessee and a series of later cases. See, e.g., U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n,
434 U.S. 452 (1978); New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363 (1976); The Tap Line Cases,
234 U.S. 1 (1914); St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co. v. James, 161 U.S. 545 (1896).
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boundary, interests in land situate in the territory of each
other, and other internal regulations for the mutual comfort
and convenience of states bordering on each other.87
According to the opinion, the Compact Clause governs agreements
that involve a state’s “private rights of sovereignty” vis-à-vis its sister states.88
The Court then offered two exemplar interstate compacts: those that
relate to “questions of boundary” and those that implicate states’ “interests
in land situate in the territory of each other.”89 Taken together, the
language of the test and the examples suggest the “private rights of
sovereignty” are generally the sort of rights that are essential to
establishing and maintaining a common respect among the states for the
territorial integrity of others. The residual language, which states that the
doctrine governs “other internal regulations for the mutual comfort and
convenience of states bordering on each other,”90 provides further indication
that compacts subject to the clause will include some component that
relates to a state’s physical dimensions.
This reading comports with both the Constitution’s structure and the
relevant case law. It accords with the structure because the Constitution
was designed with the expectation that the federal authorities would need
to weigh in to resolve state disputes, as their spillover effects could have
negative consequences for the nation.91 It thus makes sense that the
Constitution would entrust federal lawmakers with the authority to
validate or reject interstate agreements that might have ramiﬁcations for
national power. This understanding also comports with the Court’s
historical use of the Compact Clause. Indeed, the overwhelming majority
of cases in which the Clause has been invoked have involved the Court
refereeing state geographical boundary disputes.92 In context, it becomes
87. Virginia, 148 U.S. at 519 (quoting Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution
§ 1403 (1833)); see also U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 452 (applying the Virginia v. Tennessee
test and concluding that the interstate tax compact at issue did not violate the Compact
Clause because it did not infringe on federal power); Finkel, supra note 86, at 1588 (“[A]fter
U.S. Steel, the Compact Clause holds little independent meaning.”).
88. Virginia, 148 U.S. at 519.
89. Id.
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power “to regulate commerce . . .
among the several states”); id. art. III, § 2 (extending federal court jurisdiction “to
controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or
more states; between a state and citizens of another state; between citizens of different states;
between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states”); see also
Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution—A Study in
Interstate Adjustments, 34 Yale L.J. 685, 691 (1925) (calling the Constitution’s grant of
federal court “jurisdiction over ‘Controversies between two or more States’” a principal
“mode[] of adjustment”).
92. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 91, at 692 (“In fact, however, the Compact Clause
has its roots deep in colonial history. It is part and parcel of the long and familiar story of
colonial boundary controversies.”). The other cases involve matters like taxation and
utilities, which have broader national implications. See id. at 695–96 (“Difficulties in the
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clear that the federal government was given the responsibility for ensuring
mutual respect for states’ “private rights of sovereignty”—most notably
their geographical boundaries—for the beneﬁt of the nation on a whole.
Nevertheless, the Compact Clause doctrine has been applied to more
than just these types of cases.93 Assume, then, that it applies to the NPVC.
Were this so, the NPVC would still not require congressional approval
under the prevailing test. Laying out the applicable test in Virginia v.
Tennessee, the Court explained:
Looking at the clause in which the terms ‘compact’ or
‘agreement’ appear, it is evident that the prohibition is directed
to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of
political power in the states, which may encroach upon or interfere
with the just supremacy of the United States.94
The Court then rearticulated this test in the context of disputed state
borders. It stated that whether “[t]he compact or agreement will then be
within the prohibition of the Constitution,” and therefore requiring
congressional approval, depends on whether “the establishment of the
boundary line may lead . . . to the increase of the political power or
inﬂuence of the states affected and thus encroach or not upon the full and free
exercise of federal authority.”95
A cursory read of the language could certainly leave one with the
impression that the doctrine is concerned with agreements that would
augment the political clout of the states that are party to them. Yet the
pivotal language, which rests in the succeeding clause, speciﬁes that its
focus is much narrower. The Compact Clause does require congressional
approval for agreements that would result in an “increase of political
power in the states,” but only to the extent that the increase itself would
result in an “encroach[ment] upon or “interfere[nce] with the just
supremacy of the United States.”96 Thus, the test does not just ask one
question here, but two. First, do states stand to beneﬁt politically from
entering the agreement? Second, would that agreement somehow impair
the exercise of federal power? This two-step analysis is discernable from
following ﬁelds of legislation have elicited application of the Compact Clause: (1)
Boundaries and cessions of territory. (2) Control and improvement of navigation. (3) Penal
jurisdiction. (4) Uniformity of legislation. (5) Interstate accounting. (6) Conservation of
natural resources. (7) Utility regulation. (8) Taxation.”).
93. See id.
94. 148 U.S. at 519 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 520 (emphasis added); see also U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n,
434 U.S. 452, 460 (1978) (“At this late date, we are reluctant to accept this invitation to
circumscribe modes of interstate cooperation that do not enhance state power to the
detriment of federal supremacy.”).
96. Virginia, 148 U.S. at 519; see also Ronak Patel, Chapter 188: Forget College, You’re
Popular! A Review of the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, 43 McGeorge L. Rev.
645, 648 (2012) (“The Supreme Court has interpreted this political power limitation to
mean that compacts that potentially threaten federal supremacy require congressional
approval.” (citing U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 471)).
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the syntax of both iterations of the Virginia v. Tennessee test. According to
the test’s initial phrasing, “any combination tending to the increase of
political power in the states, which may encroach upon or interfere with
the just supremacy of the United States” requires consent from federal
lawmakers to come into effect.97 The concern is clearly any reallocation of
power to the states that also diminishes national sovereignty. This
construction mirrors the second articulation of the test, which demands
that Congress approve of pacts that lead to “the increase of the political
power or inﬂuence of the states affected and thus encroach or not upon the
full and free exercise of federal authority.”98 The Court’s rule here is clear:
If there is no encroachment on national supremacy, there is no
constitutional concern.
This raises an obvious question. How would the NPVC increase the
political power of its member states to the detriment of national
sovereignty? The only federal authority at issue with the NPVC is the
selection of presidential electors—a power that is uniquely conﬁned to the
states.99 The argument against the NPVC, then, proceeds in two stages:
(1) When enough states agree to the NPVC, they will have amassed
enough political power to ensure that their preferred candidate—the
winner of the national popular vote—prevails in the Electoral College.
(2) By determining the outcome of the presidency irrespective of what
the remaining states desire, the NPVC states would, in effect, eliminate the
constitutional role of the nonparty states.100
At ﬁrst glance, the critique may seem cogent. Unfortunately for its
proponents, however, its soundness depends on a sleight of hand. One
might accept the premise that the NPVC increases the political power of
some states by allowing them to determine the occupant of the White
House. But there is a signiﬁcant logical leap from that premise to the
contention that NPVC states “effectively remove the ability of noncompacting sister states to appoint their electors as they see ﬁt” as required
by the Constitution.101 In fact, this claim is just patently wrong because the

97. Virginia, 148 U.S. at 519 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 520 (emphasis added).
99. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors . . . .”); see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S.
98, 104 (2000) (relying on McPherson for the proposition that states’ power to select electors
is absolute); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892) (“[F]rom the formation of the
government until now the practical construction of the clause has conceded plenary power
to the state legislatures in the matter of the appointment of electors.”).
100. See, e.g., Muller, The Compact Clause, supra note 76, at 391 (“Once states
constituting a majority of the Electoral College have compacted to allocate their vote as a
group to one candidate, non-compacting states’ electoral votes are politically ineffective.”).
101. Contra id. (arguing that the NPVC violates the Constitution because it allows the
state to politically organize in a manner that nulliﬁes individual states’ power to select
electors in presidential contests).
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NPVC is indifferent as to how the other states exercise their power to
appoint presidential electors.
The argument also fails because there is no demonstration that the
NPVC meets the other, key requirement of the test set out in Virginia v.
Tennessee. Any shift in political power to the NPVC states would not come
at the expense of “the just supremacy of the United States”; in fact, it
cannot come at the expense of national supremacy.102 The Constitution
grants state legislatures the exclusive power to appoint electors precisely so
that they can decide who holds this national office.103 It thus deﬁes logic
to claim that state legislatures would impair national supremacy by
exercising a power that is fully committed to them. Herein lies the sleight
of hand: The argument against the NPVC shifts the focus from its impact
on the “supremacy of the United States,” which is nonexistent, to its
alleged consequences for “the rights of non-compacting states, [an]
infringement upon their sovereignty[,]” which is not an element of the
Court’s own Compact Clause test.104
So, then, what type of interstate agreement would lead to an increase
in state political power at the expense of federal authority? The Court in
Virginia v. Tennessee sought to illustrate the legal test with an example
(that, notably, involves a dispute over state boundaries):
If the boundary established is so run as to cut off an important
and valuable portion of a state, the political power of the state
enlarged would be affected by the settlement of the boundary,
and to an agreement for the running of such a boundary, or

102. See Virginia, 148 U.S. at 519; Patel, supra note 96, at 653 (noting that just because
the NPVC will affect states’ inﬂuence on presidential elections, it is “unlikely to trigger a
political-power limitation” because “it relates to the power among the states, not to the
federal government’s power over any given state”).
103. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
104. Contra Muller, The Compact Clause, supra note 76, at 391 (stressing that the
relevant power granted to the states by the Presidential Electors clause is the “right of states
to appoint electors as they see ﬁt,” and that a relative loss of political inﬂuence compared
to other states undercuts that right). It is noteworthy, however, that the Court invoked the
Compact Clause in a recent decision allowing the federal government to intervene in a
dispute between two states. See Texas v. New Mexico, 138 S. Ct. 954, 959 (2018). Worryingly,
the Court signaled that it could potentially resuscitate Taney’s approach—explicitly citing
the dicta from his opinion—and incorporate it as a consideration in the existing Compact
Clause test. Id. at 958 (“Congress’s approval serves to ‘prevent any compact or agreement
between any two States, which might affect injuriously the interests of the others.’” (quoting
Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 494 (1855))). According to the Court’s analysis,
however, at least four considerations weighed in favor of granting the government’s
application to intervene, including that the interstate compact dispute was “inextricably
intertwined with the Rio Grande Project and the Downstream Contracts,” to which the
government is a party, and that it implicated “the federal government’s ability to satisfy its
treaty obligations.” Id. at 959. Given the weight of these considerations, it is curious why the
Court took this balancing test approach to grant the federal government’s motion to
intervene as opposed to authorizing it as a right or, at a minimum, permissively.
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rather for its adoption afterwards, the consent of Congress may
well be required.105
One could imagine a situation that both adheres to these facts and
could impair national sovereignty. Suppose the terms of a compact call for
altering state lines and results in the enlarged state (State A) acquiring a
segment of the encumbered state’s (State B) population. Suppose further
that the shift in population was so drastic that it would constitutionally
entitle State A to one or more additional seats in Congress, and State B
(and perhaps others) to fewer seats. By changing the state boundaries and
the composition of Congress, the agreement would lead “to the increase
of the political power or inﬂuence of the states affected and thus
encroach . . . upon the full and free exercise of federal authority.”106
Of course, that is not what the NPVC would do. By its terms, the NPVC
would neither result in a shift in state borders nor, more importantly, “any
infringement of the rights of the national government”—far from it.107
Rather, because the NPVC involves a power that the Constitution uniquely
gives to the states—control to decide who will head this branch of the
federal government—their use of that power cannot “encroach upon or
interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.”108 The NPVC, like
prior compacts upheld by the Court, “does not purport to authorize the
member States to exercise any powers they could not exercise in its
absence.”109 To dismantle the NPVC on this basis, the Court would have to
engage in an entirely ahistorical and dishonest reading of existing
doctrine. It would have to reinterpret the case law on the obscure Article
I provision and frustrate the clear legal authority governing the applicable
and well-trodden provision in Article II. And the irony of such an outcome
should not be overlooked: For the Supreme Court to invalidate the NPVC
on the grounds that it increases the political power of a few states over the
many, it would have to strip the states of their clear constitutional
authority—authority that the Court reiterated was “plenary” in a decision
resulting in the award of a state’s Electoral College votes to the loser of the
national popular vote110—speciﬁcally because the states seek to ensure that
the political power of a few will not again dominate the choice of the many.
2. Article V: The NPVC as the Phantom Amendment. — The other
argument against the NPVC is based on the claim that it would, in effect,
105. 148 U.S. at 520.
106. Id.; see also Florida, 58 U.S. at 495 (permitting the United States to intervene in a
suit between two states to adduce evidence on behalf of the national government and the
twenty-nine other states that might have an interest in an adjustment where 1.2 million acres
of land were in dispute).
107. Virginia, 148 U.S. at 519.
108. See id.; Finkel, supra note 86, at 1616 (“The subject matter of the NPVIC is not
within the purview of Congress (which could not itself alter the constitutional framework to
eradicate the Electoral College)—there is no congressional role to be supplanted here.”).
109. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 473 (1978).
110. See Bush v. Gore, 31 U.S. 98, 104 (2000).
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abolish the Electoral College. The Electoral College, like other ﬁxtures in
the Constitution, can only be eliminated through Article V’s amendment
procedures. Because the NPVC allows member states “[t]o sidestep this
difficulty”111 or “‘drop out’ of the Electoral College,”112 its operation would
be tantamount to a constitutional amendment. Or so the argument
goes.113 But it, too, suffers from at least two ﬂaws.
One ﬂaw, again, stems from the faultiness of the argument’s premise.
The NPVC states do not “sidestep” the Electoral College. To the contrary,
they are affirmatively embracing the Electoral College because the NPVC
cannot work without it. According to its terms, the NPVC requires party
states to award their electoral votes to the winner of the national popular
vote.114 If there were no electors and, therefore, no Electoral College, the
NPVC would disintegrate. Indeed, the NPVC legislation explicitly states as
much. It reads, “This agreement shall terminate if the electoral college is
abolished.”115 Admittedly, eliminating the use of the Electoral College can
only be done through Article V’s amendment process. However,
eliminating the Electoral College is very different—conceptually and
practically—from eliminating the need for the Electoral College. States may
prefer a popular vote system. And for that reason, they may decide to work
within the Electoral College system to achieve a result functionally
equivalent to what they would get under a popular vote system. But it does
not stand to reason that they are abolishing the very structure that they
need to produce this outcome. Instead, by agreeing to the NPVC, states
are embracing the Constitution’s janky electoral system, to check the
same.
The argument’s other weakness seems almost too glaring to even
address. Nevertheless, I will indulge. By no stretch of the imagination
would the NPVC amend the Constitution. Well, perhaps by some stretch.
In the legal academy, there are schools of thought devoted to
contemplating how the Constitution might be amended without using the

111. Gringer, supra note 76, at 182 (“To sidestep this difficulty, a new movement known
as the National Popular Vote Plan (NPV) has sought to abolish the electoral college without
amending the Constitution.”).
112. Feeley, supra note 76, at 1427 (“In 2007, Maryland became the ﬁrst state to ‘drop
out’ of the Electoral College.”).
113. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 76, at 1581 (“[I]t seems inconceivable that a
Constitution that speciﬁes how the President is to be elected and that lays out a process for
amending its requirements would permit a group of states to alter so fundamental a part of
our constitutional structure.”).
114. See Text of the National Popular Vote Compact Vote, Nat’l Popular Vote,
https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/bill-text [https://perma.cc/H39N-ZJHH] (last visited
Nov. 3, 2019).
115. E.g., Md. Code Ann., Elect. Law § 8-5A-01 (West 2007).
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notoriously difficult amendment process,116 which is set out in Article V.117
The NPVC may have its origins in the legal academy,118 but fortunately it has
not been conﬁned to that realm. There is absolutely no truth to the claim
that the agreement amounts to a constitutional amendment. This is just a
positive assessment; one could readily evaluate it through observation. In
practice, should enough states breathe life into the NPVC, the Electoral
College—sadly—would remain embedded in Article II and the Twelfth
and Twenty-Third Amendments.119 This “effective amendment” theory of
constitutional change is certainly creative and interesting. But in the end,
it’s just that—a theory.

116. See Richard Albert, American Exceptionalism in Constitutional Amendment, 69
Ark. L. Rev. 217, 217 (2016) (“On one hand, the United States Constitution stands apart
from many foreign democratic constitutions: it is extraordinarily difficult to amend . . . .”);
Rosalind Dixon & David Landau, Tiered Constitutional Design, 86 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 438,
440 (2018) (“Article V of the U.S. Constitution, for example, is thought by some scholars to
make the U.S. Constitution one of the most difficult in the world to amend.”). See generally
Vicki C. Jackson, The (Myth of un)Amendability of the US Constitution and the Democratic
Component of Constitutionalism, 13 Int’l J. Const. L. 575 (2015) (providing a survey of
scholars’ assessment of the difficulty of amending the Constitution).
117. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (1991); Akhil Reed Amar,
Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment, in Responding to Imperfection: The
Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendments 89, 89–115 (Sanford Levinson ed.,
1995); Sanford Levinson, Accounting for Constitution Change (Or, How Many Times Has
the United States Constitution Been Amended? (A) <26; (B) 26; (C) >26; (D) All of the
Above), 8 Const. Comment. 409, 417 (1991); Sanford Levinson, The Political Implications
of Amending Clauses, 13 Const. Comment. 107, 113–15 (1996).
118. See, e.g., Robert W. Bennett, Popular Election of the President Without a
Constitutional Amendment, 4 Green Bag 241 (2001), http://www.greenbag.org/v4n3/v4n3_
articles_bennett.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3LN-84F9]; Amar & Amar, supra note 83; see also
Thomas H. Neale & Andrew Nolan, Cong. Research Serv., R43823, The National Popular Vote
(NPV) Initiative: Direct Election of the President by Interstate Compact 6 (2019),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43823.pdf [https://perma.cc/TJY9-5W3H] (“Law professors
Robert W. Bennett of Northwestern University, Vikram Amar of the University of California
Davis, and Akhil Amar of Yale University School of Law are generally credited as the intellectual
godparents of the concept that ultimately evolved into the National Popular Vote Interstate
Compact . . . .”).
119. One commentator makes an argument along the same lines. However, instead of
claiming that the NPVC would amend the Electoral College, he argues that it would
eliminate the contingent election process, the auxiliary procedure that gives the House of
Representatives the obligation to choose the president should a candidate not obtain a majority
of the electoral votes. See Rob Natelson, Why the “National Popular Vote” Scheme is
Unconstitutional, Tenth Amendment Ctr. (Feb. 9, 2019), https://tenthamendmentcenter.com/
2019/02/09/why-the-national-public-vote-scheme-is-unconstitutional/ [https://perma.cc/
P4QD-EJPM] (“Third, because NPV states would have a majority of votes in the Electoral
College, NPV would effectively repeal the Constitution’s provision for run-off elections in
the House of Representatives.”). The argument suffers from the very same fallacy that
undercuts the broader argument. The NPVC does not actually amend the Constitution.
Furthermore, the “contingent election” is triggered only if the electors are unable to choose
a president. If, under a NPVC system, the electors could not agree on a candidate, the
contingent election process would still come into play because, it, like the Electoral College,
would still be embedded in the Constitution.
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The chief constitutional arguments against the NPVC do not add up.
They suffer from erroneous assumptions in their baseline premises and
grave fallacies in the reasoning therefrom. If opponents of the NPVC
could somehow use them to jump through the aforementioned hoops and
stick the dismount, that would be quite the feat of legal gymnastics.
CONCLUSION
The NPVC certainly has some obstacles ahead of it. But just like the
Senate of the early 1900s, there will always be those who want to frustrate
the will of the people; there will always be a recalcitrant opposition to
defend the status quo. Advocates for the NPVC have precious little time
left to bask in the glory of the movement’s 2019 success. For 2020 is here.
And as the western states go, so goes the nation. (At least with respect to
the changes in the Electoral College’s operation.) Reformers should take
the repeal effort in Colorado seriously, while keeping their eye on what
happens to the recent court decisions and conservatives’ faulty reading of
the Constitution. It is often said that history does not repeat itself, but it
rhymes. For anyone within earshot, it sounds like the western states may
be humming a familiar tune.
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